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Abstract
Using a complete panel of Ghanaian cocoa producers’ societies in the 1930s, we 
investigate whether group interaction problems threatened i) capital accumulation, ii) 
cocoa sales and iii) cooperative survival as membership size increased. We find 
evidence of group interaction problems. The net effect, however, is positive indicating 
gains from economies of scale as cooperatives expanded their membership. 
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1. Motivation 
Cooperatives are thought to represent an effective institution for solving the 
problems that small farmers face in developing countries (ILO et al., 2008). Farmers 
join efforts and pool their resources; in turn, cooperatives provide various services to 
their members. Cooperatives may undertake marketing, which let the farmers achieve 
higher prices as compared to a situation of intermediaries with quasi-monopsonistic 
powers (Chirwa et al., 2005; Hussi & Murphy, 1993). They may also provide access 
to inputs and capital, means of risk reduction and sharing, and an institutionalised 
framework of knowledge sharing. Overall, the most important reason for the 
formation of cooperatives is the economies of scale that farmers are not able to realise 
individually.
The literature on collective action, starting from Olson (1965), emphasises 
instead negative effects of group size. Collective action, and shared ownership, both 
present coordination problems, and encourage the inefficient use of resources, if 
society members do not take into account the costs that their use will incur on the 
society as a whole. Small groups may be better equipped to overcome this problem, as 
better information and social sanctions help to ensure cooperation and thus offset 
negative effects from profit-sharing and free-riding. Larger groups, in contrast, may 
find this more difficult: monitoring is more costly and social sanctions are less 
effective.
At a certain point, group interaction problems may outweigh gains from 
economies of scale. If so, the relationship between the number of society members 
and efficiency follows an inverted U pattern, implying that an optimum size exists for 
cooperatives. Nevertheless, institutional design can mitigate group interaction 
problems. Ostrom (2005) and Ahn et al (2009), for example, pointed to entry and exit 3
rules influencing behaviour and minimising free-rider problems, thereby improving 
the efficiency of collective action even in large groups. Thus, there may not 
necessarily be any relationship between group size and the viability of cooperatives. 
Ghana’s cocoa cooperatives provide an interesting case for analysing the role 
that group size can play in cooperatives. In the period under study, Ghana was the 
world’s leading producer of cocoa with the crop entirely produced by small farmers; 
cooperatives were a new institution fostered by the British colonial administration; 
farmers had little or no prior experience in cooperatives. This element of exogeneity 
in cooperative formation allows us to explore more clearly the determinants of 
cooperative success. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives background information on 
the cooperatives in Ghana in the 1930s. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 and 5 
presents available evidence on free-rider problems in capital accumulation and 
marketing of cocoa. In section 6 we explain survival of cooperatives testing the 
impact of membership size as well as other covariates including lack of capital, 
competition and transport costs. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background
Cooperatives in Ghana were not an indigenously grown institution, but were 
introduced by the colonial administration.
1 The aim was to improve cocoa quality and 
yields, and to reduce the indebtedness of cocoa farmers (Department of Agriculture. 
Gold Coast, 1931). The Cooperative Societies Ordinance No. 4 of 1931 set the legal 
                                                          
1 Concepts of cooperation existed in the country in various forms and was known as “Nwoboa” among 
farmers in the Akan speaking communities (Department of Cooperatives, 1990). 4
framework for cooperatives and laid down the rights and liabilities of society 
members.
2
The generally accepted unit was the village; members had to occupy land within 
the area of the village (Department of Agriculture. Gold Coast, 1931). Officers of the 
Department of Agriculture sought the support of chiefs and visited villages to explain 
the aims and rules of cooperative organisations. The targeting of villages followed 
somewhat peculiar rules.
3 Preference was given to the big, easily reachable villages 
along the main roads, which is indeed clearly visible on a map (Figure 1). Moreover, 
the Department of Agriculture concentrated their activities on a few areas and 
expanded in waves to all areas in Ghana’s cocoa belt. Lacking prior experience, the 
idea of cooperatives met suspicion and the forming of cooperatives had a clear trial 
character, e.g. 44 of the 499 societies existed for just one season. 
The cooperatives were dual-purpose organisations providing marketing as well 
as thrift and loan facilities. As far as marketing is concerned, cooperatives collected 
the dried and fermented cocoa beans in the society’s store (Shephard, 1936, p. 48). 
After two weeks or more, when a sufficient quantity has been accumulated, the 
District Agricultural Officer analysed samples and certified the purity (percentage of 
mouldy, germinated, slaty, weevilly, and defective cocoa beans) if it exceeded 95%.
4
The cocoa was offered to cocoa-buying firms in the nearest large buying centre. 
Sealed tenders were received, considered and accepted by the Committee of the 
society. The cocoa was delivered, cash obtained and finally distributed to members. 
                                                          
2 The Ordinance of 1931 was substantially revised in 1937. 
3 Due to the lack of agricultural survey data, it is impossible to compare the distribution of cooperatives 
with the general population of cocoa farmers. For a general description, see Hill (1963). 
4 Patterson (1933, p.11) reported a purity of 97.3% and 89.3% for cooperative and ordinary cocoa 
respectively in the 1931/32 season. The difference, however, decreased in the mid-1930s, largely due 
to a rise in the general standard of purity (Nowell, 1938, p. 42). 5
The market was characterised by oligopsonistic structures: 10 European firms 
shipped 90% of the cocoa exported in 1933/34 (Nowell, 1938, p. 191).
5 Cooperatives 
did not challenge their position during our study period, but were merely by-passing 
intermediaries/ cocoa brokers. 
Paterson (1934: 241) reported that, on average, cooperatives obtained a price by 
about one shilling per load (60 lb) higher than the general local price. Cooperatives 
deducted a fee of six pence per load to cover operating costs. Thus, in principle, 
cooperative farmers were left with a meagre 6% mark up over the Gold Coast 
producer price (which ranged between 8.3 and 9.1 shillings in the 1931-33 period). 
Nevertheless, cooperatives may have delivered higher revenues by using correct 
measurement scales, unlike cocoa brokers whose opportunistic behaviour in weighing 
farmers’ cocoa was often reported. 
Thrift and loan services were often identified as the main reason why farmers 
joined the cooperative. Loans were given for various purposes, usually for periods of 
a few months (Table 1).
6 The 1931 Ordinance required that the rate of interest on 
loans must not exceed 10% per annum, which was significantly less than the 50% to 
100% what money lenders or cocoa brokers implicitly charged (Austin, 2005). 
Lending represented a significant activity in the cooperatives; in the 1934/35 season, 
for example, the ratio of loans to share-capital amounted 0.36. 
Obviously, services were only provided to members. Costs of becoming a 
member for most societies included an entrance fee of one shilling and subscription of 
                                                          
5 Twelve cocoa-buying firms, which accounted for 95% of cocoa exports, did indeed collude and 
entered a buying agreement in 1937, to which Ghanaian cocoa growers responded with a producers’ 
strike (Austin, 1988). 
6 The average value of loan was 41.9 and 31.3 shillings in the years 1933/34 and 1934/35 respectively 
(Paterson, 1935, p. 9). This compares with an average wage of day labourer of approximately 1.25 
shillings per day (Gold Coast, 1931). 6
at least five shares of one shilling each. Members also bear higher production costs to 
meet the higher quality requirements for cooperative graded cocoa. 
Table 2 shows the development of the cooperative movement in Ghana. 
Cooperative societies mushroomed after the enactment of the 1931 Ordinance. 
Between 1929 and 1932, the number of societies increased 14-fold, and the number of 
members increased 10-fold. By then, cooperative societies marketed 2% of the cocoa 
that was exported from Ghanaian ports. After 1933, cooperatives went through a 
phase of consolidation. The share capital per member (in real terms), however, 
steadily increased from £0.7 in 1931 to £1.9 in 1936. 
The tensions between economies of scale and loyalty problems received much 
attention from contemporary observers. In the 1931/32 report, for example, A. W. 
Paterson, director of the Agricultural Department at that time, stated that ‘when the 
main purpose of a society is the handling and sale of some readily realisable crop, it 
would appear obvious that the larger society should be more efficient. It must not be 
lost sight of, however, that it is the efficiency of management together with the loyalty 
of members that either makes or breaks any society’ (Paterson, 1933, p.3). Expulsions 
of ‘useless’ and ‘undesirable’ members were mentioned in almost every audit report 
from 1933/34 on (Paterson, 1935: 4; Scott, 1934: 2). 
3. Data
Our core data is derived from balance sheets and statement of accounts 
published in annual audit reports by the Department of Agriculture (Paterson, various 
years). These reports list the name of each society, date of formation, location, 
number of members, paid up capital, revenue and quantity of cocoa sold, profit/losses, 
reserves and dividends. Each society’s books were audited by trained agricultural 7
officers of the Department of Agriculture, so that we can assume a good 
comparability of the figures. Overall, we have data of all 500 societies that existed in 
the period 1930-36 and that sold cocoa, 119 of which exited in the period 1930-36.
7
We supplemented the data with background information of the villages where 
the cooperatives were operating. Data on infrastructure at that time (distance to roads, 
railroads, ports) is readily available on contemporary road maps (Survey Headquarters 
Accra, 1937). Maps also exist for soil classifications (Ghana Department of Soil and 
Land Use Survey, 1958) and monthly rainfall available as a panel of 0.5 degree grid 
resolution from CRU TS 2.1 (Mitchell et al., 2004). We digitised these maps and, 
using the geographic coordinates of the villages as identifier, merged the information 
with the core data set. In addition, population estimates were retrieved from the 1931 
Census (Gold Coast Census Office & Cardinall, 1932). We found the geographic 
location of 444 villages and identified 428 villages in the Census, or about 89% and 
86% of the societies respectively. Alternative spellings of village names and 
popularity of certain place names are the main reasons for attrition. 
4. Capital accumulation and membership 
Cooperative firms mobilize capital primarily through retained earnings and 
through members’ purchase of shares. Recent literature has emphasised how the 
vaguely defined nature of property rights in cooperative firms may contribute to 
capital mobilization problems among members. According to Cook (1995) and 
Iliopoulos (2005), a vague definition of property rights in traditional cooperatives 
arises from the combination of open membership, lack of a market for ownership 
                                                          
7 Discrepancies with figures in Table 1 can be explained by societies that have not started to sell cocoa. 
Figures on the number of societies and members, and paid up capital from our data set are ca. 1%-5% 
lower than in Table 1. 8
rights and equally distributed voting rights between members, three characteristics 
that Ghanaian cocoa cooperatives also met.
8
Open membership may impede capital accumulation by exacerbating free-rider 
problems: existing members cannot appropriate the full value of the benefits deriving 
from the investments they have funded (Iliopoulos, 2005: 16). This problem may 
become more serious, the larger the society is. Moreover, lack of a market for 
ownership rights, combined with equally distributed voting rights, may give rise to 
horizon problems. Because members cannot sell their ownership rights  at a price that 
reflects the performance of the cooperative, they find it unprofitable to invest in long-
term projects which generate returns over a period which is longer than the investor’s 
own time horizon (Furubotn & Pejovic, 1970)
9  Heterogeneity  in  membership 
characteristics and preferences with respect to investments is likely to increase with 
the size of the society. 
We test for the influence of group size on shared capital C. We model 
nonlinearities in the relationship using number of members M and its log:
10
(1) i i i i M M M C         2 1 ln ) ln(  
If  1>0 and  2<0, the relationship follows an inverted U pattern (though not 
necessarily across the observed data).
                                                          
8 Section 13 of the 1931 Cooperative Ordinance laid down the principle of one man, one vote in the 
affairs of the society; section 14 restricted the transfer of shares to members of the cooperative. 
Note however that the share price does not reflect the good or bad performance of the cooperative, it is 
just kept in real terms. 
9 In the case of Ghanaian societies, free-rider tendencies may be further exacerbated by the trial 
character of the cooperatives, as a short time horizon of members, further discourages investment in 
capital from members. 
10 Nonlinearities are typically modelled using the variable and its square root (or its squared form). We 
prefer the log specification. The specification allows for a concave function including an inverted U 
pattern. Should the member variable turn out to be insignificant, however, coefficients in the log-log 
specification can be conveniently interpreted as elasticities. Conclusions do not change when using 
third or higher degree polynomials. 9
We start the analysis with a pure cross-section of cooperatives i where variables 
measure the condition in the first year of existence. Under the most parsimonious 
specification as in equation (1), we find indeed an inverted U relationship (column (1), 
Table 3). The positive effect levels off after cooperatives have reached a membership 
size of about 20, and each member contributes about 10 shillings of capital on average. 
In contrast, the capital per member ratio of the largest 10% cooperatives (>25 
members) is equivalent to that of the median cooperative (with 11-13 members), ca. 8 
shillings on average (Figure 2). 
Certainly, the ability of farmers to contribute capital depended upon their wealth. 
We can partly control for wealth (and indeed capital taking the form of mature cocoa 
trees), as cocoa cultivation started on highly suitable soils in the Eastern region and 
then moved westwards (Hill, 1963). When including soil quality as a proxy for wealth 
and capital accumulation in the older cocoa-growing areas, and controlling for the 
cooperatives’ year of formation and district fixed effects, membership size becomes 
insignificant (column (2), Table 3). 
Finally, we run a 2SLS to account for possible endogeneities. Our instrumental 
variable is the village population aged 15 to 45. All other things equal, cooperatives 
draw more members from a larger pool of farmers in more populated villages. As 
indicated by the high F-value in the First Stage regression, our instrument is strong.
11
The point estimate for membership, however, remains small and insignificant (column 
(3), Table 3).
12
To understand the dynamics of capital accumulation, we use the panel data. In 
the first two specifications we rerun the regression models from the cross-section 
above. The inverted U relationship between members and capital per member is more 
                                                          
11 As a rule of thumb, an F-value lower than 10 points to a weak instrument (Staiger & Stock, 1997). 
12 Unfortunately, non-linear transformations of the IV are not suited to identify the non-linearity. 10
pronounced than in the pure cross-section (columns (1), Table 4).
13 The  upward 
sloping part is steeper and the maximum shifted to the right (to a membership of 30). 
Moreover, we find an inverted U pattern even when including soil quality, year of 
formation and district fixed effects (columns (2), Table 4). This result, however, 
should be treated with care. Shared capital and membership both follow a trend (see 
section   2). As the trend of the former surpasses the latter, we might obtain a spurious, 
inverted U-type relationship. Moreover, cooperatives differ in many important 
respects, e.g. in by-laws and institutional solutions mitigating free-riding problems 
(and allowing cooperatives to grow in membership), external conditions such as 
access to land and the indebtedness of the farming population from which members 
are drawn. Confounding factors of this sort are likely to influence both capital and 
membership. 
We address those issues by applying panel estimation techniques. We estimate 
equation
(2) it t i it it it it AGE M M M C    	         2 1 ln ) ln(  
where  i are society fixed effects capturing any unobserved, time-invariant 
heterogeneity between cooperatives i ;
14  t are time dummies; AGEit are dummy 
variables for the age of cooperative i at time t (in years). 
Under this specification we find  1<0 and  2>0 (column (3), Table 4). Thus, 
capital per member falls with membership though the negative effect diminishes 
gradually in larger cooperatives. Coefficients of AGEit and  t describe a very 
interesting pattern of capital accumulation. Newly created cooperatives had a lower 
                                                          
13 An F-Test rejects the null that coefficients of members and log members are equal in the panel and 
cross-section (p-value<0.0001). 
14 Hausman tests reject random effects models in favour of fixed effects (p-value<0.001). Note that 
fixed effects essentially remove all societies that existed for one year only from our analysis. 11
capital per member ratio than established ones, but they were able to catch up within 
two years (Figure 3). Survivorship bias does not drive this result; the pattern does not 
change when restricting the analysis to societies that survived at least five years 
(coefficients not reported to save space).
15
Next, we extend the model by including lagged variables: 
(3) it t i it it it it it AGE X M M M C    	 
           1 2 1 ln ) ln(  
where Xit-1 is a vector of lagged variables including profits, dividends and the 
dependent variable C/M. Profits are expected to have a positive effect on members’ 
contribution to society’s shared capital: profitability signals viability of the 
cooperative and stimulates further investment from members. The effects dividends 
can have are not so clear. On the one hand, dividend payments could indicate that the 
cooperative ran out of viable investment opportunities, so that additions to the capital 
base are not required. On the other hand, and probably more reasonable in the 
Ghanaian context, dividends could indicate cooperatives that honour the right of 
society members to any surplus income generated by the cooperative and this should 
encourage loyalty and commitment to the society.
16   Finally, we allow capital 
accumulation to follow an AR(1) process. 
Estimating equation (3) we again find that individual contributions to shared 
capital significantly decrease as membership size increases (column (4), Table 4). 
There is no evidence of an inverted-U or U-type relationship as  2 is not significantly 
different from 0. Excluding  2Mit from the model, results indicate that a 1% increase 
                                                          
15 Survivorship influences levels not the trends. We analyse exits of cooperatives in section   0. 
16 By-laws often regulated that a certain proportion of the profits had to be paid into the reserve fund. In 
our sample, we find two modes at 0 and 0.2-0.25 for 18% and 37% of the profit-making societies. 12
in the membership size lowered capital per member by 0.23%. This result is 
consistent with the free riding hypothesis. 
Other interpretations, however, are possible. For example, it may reflect a 
particular pattern of membership expansion, where larger, wealthier farmers join first, 
and smaller farmers follow later on. Large farmers may have sufficient liquidity to 
pay the membership fee and to purchase shares, and may arguably be less risk averse 
than smaller farmers who shy away from this new business form. This story is backed 
by reports that many cocoa farmers were indebted. Thus, one way for cooperative 
societies to keep expanding their capital base may have been to allow in also smaller 
farmers, in spite of the fact that they would be able to subscribe fewer shares only.
We address this issue by modelling time trends that capture any society-specific 
membership expansion patterns such as the acceptance of ever less wealthy farmers.
17
This is done by interacting society fixed effects with the cooperative’s age  it AGE  in 
years (0, 1, 2, …, 7): 
(4) it it i t i it it it it AGE X M M M C     
           1 2 1 ln ) ln(
The coefficient for membership size is negative and highly significant (column 
(4), Table 4). The estimate of  1 is also much larger than previously. This further 
supports the hypothesis that an influx of new members, e.g. above cooperative 
specific trends, increases free-riding problems, leading to a decline in the individual 
contributions to shared capital. 
Certainly, for the society it is not so much capital per member but the total 
amount of capital raised what matters. Estimates of  1 are negative, but always less 
                                                          
17 The available instrumental variable does not vary over time and can therefore not be used.  13
than unity, which implies that share capital indeed increased with membership size. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that this came at a price. 
5. Evidence on loyalty 
The cooperative societies faced problems inherent to their organisation. To start 
with, members could default on loans. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed 
information about repayment discipline.
18 Institutional solutions existed to keep up 
repayment discipline: Members could only take out loans in excess of their share 
capital on the guarantee of two other members who had unallocated share capital. At 
the end of the 1934/35 season only 7.9% of outstanding and granted loans in 1934 
were reported overdue (Paterson, 1935).
19
Cooperative members were required to sell their cocoa through the society. The 
Department of Agriculture considered quantities of illicit cocoa sales to be substantial 
pointing to the large number of society members selling no cocoa at all through their 
society (the frequency ranged between 20-30% in the period under study) and 
assuming that other members only marketed a portion of their crops cooperatively 
(Shephard, 1936, p. 51). Average cocoa bean production per farmer was estimated at 
one ton. A cooperative farmer, in contrast, sold less, ca. 0.55 ton on average in the 
1930-1936 period; average sales per cooperative member increased over time 
however (Table 2). 
An important impediment was probably that members had pledged their cocoa 
farms or were bound by forward contracts. However, even if farmers were free to sell, 
disincentives existed. Cooperative farmers had to wait about two to three weeks to 
receive payments – at a time of the year when farmers usually ran low on money 
                                                          
18 Insofar as defaults resulted in capital losses, we treated them in the section before. 
19 Exits of societies with high defaults could have improved the standing of the surviving cooperatives.  14
(Shephard, 1936, p. 48). Cocoa brokers, in contrast, paid on the spot. Moreover, 
reports of contemporaries indicated that the slightly higher price of cooperative 
branded cocoa may not have justified the costs to achieve the required quality 
(Nowell, 1938, p. 43; Shephard, 1936, p. 38). 
Disloyal members created negative externalities: they delayed the collection of 
cocoa sufficient to warrant an invitation for tenders and therewith increased the time 
that cooperative farmers had to wait for payment. They might also have affected 
income of others, if a premium was obtained for bulk quantity or if average costs were 
decreasing with quantity. 
Selling to other buyers was a breach of society rules; members could be expelled 
from the society and faced a financial penalty for every load of cocoa sold illicitly. 
However, shirking is not easily observable. In line with the literature on collective 
action, we hypothesise that group size plays a role: smaller cooperatives may have an 
information advantage, in that it is more difficult to hide illicit cocoa sales from 
fellow members. 
In the analysis we face the same problem as the cooperatives in that we do not 
observe shirking directly (Shephard, 1936, p. 51).
20 What we observe, however, are 
cocoa sales to the societies (in metric tons). Our strategy is therefore to use cocoa 
sales S, expressed in per member terms, as dependent variable and test for the 
influence of membership numbers M:
(5) it t i it it it it it AGE X M M M S    	 
           2 1 ln ) ln(  
                                                          
20 Even if such data as illicit cocoa sales were available, it would probably not represent an accurate 
reflection of the extent of shirking anyway. 15
where X is a vector of control variables;  i are society fixed effects;  t are time 
dummies; AGE are dummy variables for the age of cooperative gradually added to the 
model as in the section before. 
In the absence of shirking, the supply of cocoa to the cooperative should equal 
the aggregate supply of the individual cocoa farmers. Therefore, our set of controls is 
derived from the supply function: cocoa price, soil quality within a 5 km radius of the 
village, shared capital (as it could be used for loans to pay the wage bill; it makes 
shirking also more difficult as the society gets a clearer idea of the production scale of 
the farmer), monthly rainfalls, and transport infrastructure (Ali, 1969; Hattink et al., 
1998; Zuidemaa et al., 2005).
21 What simplifies the analysis is that cocoa is a 
perennial crop. The Amelonado Forastero type of cocoa trees, predominant in Ghana 
at that time, took around five to six years before a first increase in yield occurred with 
a second increase in yield in the ninth or tenth year. Thus, we can rule out any effect 
of cooperatives on the members’ choice of growing new trees on cocoa sales during 
our period of study. 
Without any controls, we find cocoa sales per members to follow an inverted U 
relationship, with a maximum reached at ca. 40 members (column (1), Table 5). With 
controls particularly shared capital and year dummies, the relationship between 
membership and cocoa sales is weaker, and rather follows a log-log linear pattern 
(column (2), Table 5). When we introduce cooperative fixed-effects, the impact of 
membership on cocoa sales per member is substantially larger (column (3), Table 5). 
Under a specification with lagged capital and cocoa sales per member, we obtain 
similar results (column (4), Table 5). 
                                                          
21 The cocoa price was derived by dividing the cooperative’s revenues from cocoa sales by the quantity 
of cocoa sold.16
Like in the previous section, we are concerned that certain patterns of 
membership expansion influence cocoa sales per member which are largely unrelated 
to free riding problems or economies of scale. Firstly, larger, wealthier farmers may 
have joined the cooperative first. If true, cocoa sales per member fall with 
membership. Secondly, cooperatives were indeed replacing cocoa brokers but farmers 
were initially bound, e.g. by forward contracts. As trends may differ across societies, 
we add society-specific age trends to our model. We find a positive impact of 
membership turning only slightly negative in cooperatives with more than 50 
members (column (6), Table 5). In fact, we can simplify and assume a log-log linear 
relationship. Then, a 1% increase in membership increases sales per member by 
0.57%.
Overall, we find a positive impact of membership on cocoa sales per member, 
especially for the small sizes within most Ghanaian cocoa producing cooperatives 
operated (Figure 2). We conclude that economies of scale outweighed free riding 
problems with respect to cocoa sales. 
6. Determinants of Exits 
We finally analyse the role of membership in the survival of cooperatives. Our 
definition of ‘exit’ includes societies that were disbanded, dissolved or liquidated.
22
Between 1930 and 1936, 107 out of the 499 cooperatives in our sample, or 21%, 
ceased to operate and exited the market. Cooperatives were at particular high risk of 
exiting within the first two years of operation: 37% and 25% of exits happened within 
the first and second year respectively (Figure 4). 
                                                          
22 Mergers are considered exits too. However, we only know of four societies that merged with a 
neighbouring unit in 1936 (Steemson, 1938, p. 4). 17
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to explore the determinants of 
cooperative exit:
23
(6)   } X ln (t)exp{ h h(t) min 3 2 1 0 0 
           M M M
where h(t) is the hazard rate at time t; h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate function; Mmin is 
a dummy variable indicating a cooperative with less than 10 members; X is a vector of 
controls gradually added to the regression. 
Again, membership size M is the variable of interest. We add Mmin as the 1931 
Cooperative Ordinance set a minimum membership criterion, whereby societies with 
less than 10 members would be disbanded. The rule, however, was not strictly 
enforced, as the colonial authorities sought to promote the formation of cooperatives 
and to convince farmers by example of the advantages of cooperatives.
24 Our set of 
control variables includes typical determinants of firm survival and exit such as firm 
size (in terms of capital, revenues), profitability, market attributes, and aggregate 
economic conditions (Agarwal & Gort, 1996).
25
Note that explanatory variables do not measure conditions at the time of exit. 
Audit reports were published at the end of each cocoa growing season; exits occurred 
afterwards. This means that the data is lagged by anything from one day to one year 
prior to the exit. We report coefficients in the form of hazard ratios: estimates larger 
than 1 imply a higher risk of exit, and vice versa for estimates smaller than 1. 
Estimating equation (6) with year and district fixed effects as the only controls 
we find no evidence for an inverted-U relationship between membership size and 
                                                          
23 Specification tests using Schoenfeld residuals show no evidence that our specifications violate the 
proportional-hazards assumption. 
24 Over the period under observation, 23% of failed societies were not complying with the minimum 
membership requirement at the moment of exit. We also experimented with a variable indicating the 
number of members at the first year of existence, but it was never significant. 
25 Using French data Pérotin (2006) found pattern and determinants of cooperative firm exit to be not 
significantly different from those of capitalist firms. 18
survival. Cooperatives with less than 10 members are significantly more likely to exit, 
but beyond that, the hazard rate is merely decreasing with membership size (column 
(1), Table 6). 
Capital and cocoa sales are likely to be crucial determinants of cooperative 
survival. We know from the previous sections that membership influences both cocoa 
sales (positively) and capital per member (negatively). Thus, in the next specification, 
we add those two variables to see whether membership has any additional effect 
beyond (columns (2), Table 6). While higher cocoa sales and capital per member 
significantly reduce hazard rates, we find the effect of membership size on survival 
essentially unchanged (compare columns (3) and (4), Table 6). 
The positive effect of membership size on survival could be primarily a result of 
its positive effect on the total amount of cocoa sales and shared capital. We test this 
idea by re-estimating the model without expressing the variables in per member terms. 
The hypothesis is indeed supported by the data (columns (5), Table 6): falling below 
the minimum membership requirement still increases the likelihood of exit, but the 
other two variables of membership are jointly insignificant (p-value: 0.70). We come 
to the same result when adding more controls to the model (column (6), Table 6). 
Coefficients of the additional covariates are in line with what one would expect: 
survival is a positive function of the price that the cooperatives obtained from the 
cocoa-buying firms and additions to reserves. Only the negative impact of 
profitability on survival is counterintuitive at first sight. However, it is not the purpose 
of cooperatives to be profitable - in contrast to capitalist firms. For example, in our 
context, cooperatives could make a profit by lowering the price passed on to their 
members (Shephard, 1936, p. 57). As we included cooperative revenues in our 
regression, this is what “profits” is likely to be picking up, if marketing generates the 19
bulk of revenue and marketing costs are relatively homogenous across societies. It is 
quite reasonable that cooperatives benefit their members most by passing on any 
surplus directly to the members who market their cocoa through their society rather 
than seeking and distributing the rents through other channels. 
Our findings are robust to a series of robustness checks (results not reported here 
to save space). We used dummy variables (up to 10 categories) for membership size; 
we tested for the influence of membership size at the first year of existence; we also 
estimated a Weibull duration model, which fits the data well. 
7. Bigger is Better 
We investigated the role of group size on cooperative performance. On the one 
hand, a large membership base will help to realise economies of scale. On the other 
hand, it can create group interaction problems. 
During the phase of cooperative formation and consolidation that characterised 
Ghanaian cocoa producer societies of the 1930s, we found that membership size had a 
negative effect on per capita subscriptions; though by expanding membership 
cooperatives could increase their capital base in the aggregate. Despite of 
contemporary reports on frequent shirking in cocoa sales, we found that sales per 
member were actually increasing with membership. Exclusions of disloyal members 
could well have contributed to this result. In a survival analysis, we found that a larger 
membership improved the chances of cooperative survival. 
We do not claim that group interaction problems were not present or costly, what 
we can conclude however is that positive effects of membership expansion 
outweighed negative ones. The size at which Ghanaian cooperatives were operating 
was still sufficiently small to be able to benefit from an increase in membership size. 20
While Ghanaian cooperatives were not held back by free-rider problems, 
cooperative marketing failed to achieve a large volume in the 1930s. To blame is the 
general environment under which the cooperatives operated. One factor was certainly 
the misled emphasis on purity of cocoa beans imposed by the Department of 
Agriculture. Historically, the cooperative brand failed in the market. It nevertheless 
increased production costs of cooperative farmers. After World War II, for example, 
when the emphasis was changed and cooperatives were allowed buying commissions, 
their market share rapidly rose to one third. In the 1930s, the main advantage of 
membership could well have been the credit and banking facilities offered by the 
cooperatives. Lending represented a significant activity and loans had to come from 
shared capital. Shared capital is also a strong predictor of cocoa sales, and cooperative 
survival. However, such overall conditions affected all societies but cannot explain 
why certain cooperatives thrived. 21
Table 1 Loans granted to farmers by cocoa marketing societies, 1934/35




Purpose for which granted 
1,748  2,437  71.6   Expenses of cultivation (labour) 
166 275  8.1   Maintenance  expenses  (household) 
44  159  4.7   Purchase of farm or land 
57 114  3.4   Old  debts 
43 107  3.1   Building  expenses 
23  97  2.9   Redemption of mortgage farms 
37 54  1.6   Hospital  fees 
24 52  1.5   Education  expenses 
17 38  1.1   Funeral  expenses 
17 70  2.0   Other 
2,176 3,405  100.0   Total 
Source: Appendix L, Audit report 1934/35 (Paterson, 1935). 




















1929 27  724  355  0.2
1930 40  949  619  0.2
1931 270 4,847 3,353 3,353 2,248  0.9
1932 390 7,905 5,754 5,808 4,217  1.8
1933 414 8,744 7,528 7,323 4,084  1.7
1934 417 8,975 9,632 9,161 5,956  2.2
1935 398 8,721  12,983 11,625 6,384  2.0
1936 398 9,663  24,150 18,658 7,879  3.3
1937 385 9,711  26,422 23,173 404  0.2
1938 371 9,399  28,299 23,749 9,404  3.3
1939 353 8,689  4,000  1.8
1940      
1941 265 6,375  21,562 11,254 9,924  7.9
1942 253 6,149  22,424 11,426 9,446  5.0
1943 254 6,439  24,575 12,118 11,420  5.5
Source: Agricultural cooperative societies annual audit reports (Paterson, various years) and annual 
reports of the Department of Agriculture (various years). Price deflator and total cocoa export were 
taken from Viton (1955). 22
Table 3 Determinants of raising capital (cross section, first year of existence)
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of share capital per member (in £). Estimator in (1) and 
(2) is OLS; estimator in (3) is 2SLS; all regressions include a constant; robust t-statistics/z-statistics in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) 
Number of cooperative members     
 Ln(Members)  0.592***  0.274  -0.029 
   (3.495)  (1.332)  (-0.089) 
 Members  -0.022*  -0.018   
   (-1.935)  (-1.538)   
        
Cocoa soil classifications within 
5km radius of the village (in %)     
  Soil class I    0.920***  0.931*** 
     (3.433)  (3.242) 
Soil class II    0.414*  0.435** 
     (1.894)  (2.008) 
  Soil class III    0.202*  0.300** 
(1.666) (2.424) 
      
Year of formation FE   Yes Yes 
District FE   Yes Yes 
      
IV Relevance tests for Ln(Village 
population aged 15 to 45)      
 Shea  Partial  R
2     0.082 
 F(1,  322)      25.57 
  Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic      29.67 
      
Observations 438  390  347 
R
2-adj. 0.017  0.235  0.251 23
Table 4 Determinants of capital accumulation (panel)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of cooperative members
 Ln(Members)  0.816*** 0.697***  -0.217**  -0.279*** -0.725** 
   (11.25)  (5.784)  (-2.416)  (-2.721)  (-5.177) 
 Members  -0.010*** -0.015*** 0.006*  0.002  -0.004 
   (-4.038)  (-3.214)  (1.772)  (0.536)  (0.720) 
    
Cocoa soil classifications within 5km 
radius of the village (in %)
Soil class I  0.734*   
(1.888)  
Soil class II  0.503***   
(4.932)  
Soil class III  0.367***   
(5.484)  
       
Profit,  dividends  (in  £)       
  Profits per member (in t-1)        0.122**  0.049 
        (2.185)  (0.553) 
  Dividends per member (in t-1)        0.440*  0.047 
        (1.796)  (0.161) 
       
Ln(Capital per member) in t-1      0.259***  -0.099* 
      (8.578)  (-1.919) 
       
Year of formation FE   Yes      
District FE   Yes      
Age FE     Yes  Yes  
Year FE      Yes Yes Yes 
Society FE      Yes Yes Yes 
Society FE*Age trends       Y e s  
       
N  Observations  1855 1673 1855 1303 1303 
N  cooperatives  494 440 494 432 432 
R
2-adj.  0.114 0.249 0.829 0.914 0.962 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of share capital per member (in £). Estimator is OLS; all 
regressions include a constant; robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 24
Table 5 Determinants of cocoa sales per member
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of cooperative members
Ln(Members)  0.403***  0.224**  0.655*** 0.591***  1.162** 
(5.436) (2.142) (4.205) (2.752) (2.252) 
Members  -0.009***  -0.003 -0.012** -0.006  -0.023* 
(-3.556) (-0.767) (-2.230) (-0.987) (-1.660) 
     
Ln(Cooperative cocoa price)   -0.382  -0.307  0.251  0.155 
 (-1.470)  (0.306)  (0.716)  (0.332) 
Cocoa soil classifications in 5km radius (in %)
Soil class I  0.467     
(1.631)    
Soil class II  0.157* 
(1.845)
Soil class III  -0.049
(-0.759)
Transport (Distance in km)     
Distance to road class I    -0.009***     
(-2.774)    
Distance to railroad    0.003*     
(1.710)    
Distance to cocoa buying centre  -0.002    
(-0.484)    
Distance to port  -0.003*     
(-1.771)    
     
Share capital (in £)      
Ln(Capital per member)  0.724***  0.548*** 0.812*** 0.810*** 
(22.12)  (11.31) (10.85) (4.854) 
Ln(Capital per member) in t-1   -0.074  0.044 
 (-1.170)  (0.396) 
    
Ln(Cocoa sales per member) in t-1    -0.133*** -0.435*** 
(-2.842) (-8.411) 
     
Rainfall 0.5 x 0.5 grid    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year of formation FE   Yes      
District FE   Yes      
Age FE    Yes Yes Yes   
Year FE    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Society FE    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Society FE*Age Trends      Y e s  
     
N observations  1800 1606 1618 1186 1186 
N cooperatives  489 429 432 389 389 
R
2-adj. 0.015 0.473 0.652 0.708 0.804 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of cocoa sales per member. Estimator is OLS; all 
regressions include a constant; robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.125
Table 6 Determinants of exits of cooperatives
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of cooperative members     
Members<10 (1=Yes)  2.028*  2.442*  2.192** 2.467**  2.442*  2.505* 
(1.833) (1.912) (2.158) (2.231) (1.912) (1.958)
Ln(Members)  0.209**  0.356  0.279*** 0.368***  1.244  1.156 
(-2.380) (-1.492) (-3.730) (-3.038)  (0.299) (0.180)
Members  1.017  1.002  1.002  0.999 
(0.466) (0.054)   (0.054)  (-0.019)
Share capital (in £) 
Ln(Capital per member)  0.587***   0.587***  
(-2.911)  (-2.952)   
Ln(Capital) 0.587***  0.675** 
(-2.911) (-1.979) 
Revenues
Ln(Cocoa sales per member)  0.488***   0.488***  
(-6.158)  (-6.180)   
Ln(Cocoa sales)  0.488***  0.451*** 
(-6.158) (-6.180) 
Ln(Cooperative price)  0.054** 
(-2.398)
Profits, Reserves, Dividends (in £) 
Profits 1.051** 
(1.989)
Additions to reserves  0.331** 
(-1.964)
Infrastructure (Distances in km) 
Distance to road class I  0.974 
(-1.043)
Distance to railroad  0.998 
(-0.249)
Distance to port  0.996 
(-0.418)
Distance to cocoa buying centre  0.983 
(-0.641)
District FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   
N Failed cooperatives  89 78 89 78 78 74 
N Cooperatives  443  432  443  432 432 428 
Note: Estimator is duration model; coefficients are hazard ratios; robust z-values in parentheses. 























































Figure 2: Membership size of cooperatives (kernel density plots)
Note: For a better readability, the graph is truncated at a membership size of 60. Membership numbers at the first year 
of existence ranged between 2 and 62 (mean: 15.6; sd: 7.2); figures for the panel range between 2 and 150 (mean: 20.6; 
sd: 13.1). 
Figure 3: Capital accumulation - predicted effect of year and age of cooperative
Note: Based on results in column (3), Table 4. A cooperative formed in 1930 was chosen as reference. 28
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Note: The Kaplan-Meier survivor function estimates the probability of cooperatives surviving longer than time t.  29
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